De-industrialisation and the post-communist transition:Rowthorn and Wells' model revisited by Mickiewicz, Tomasz & Zalewska, Anna
28/11/2005 
UCL SCHOOL OF SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF 
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CHANGE 
IN EUROPE 
(CSESCE) 
                                              
                                                                                             
De-industrialisation and the Post-Communist Transition: 
Rowthorn and Wells’ Model Revisited  
 
Tomasz Mickiewicz, UCL - SSEES, UK 
(t.mickiewicz@ssees.ucl.ac.uk) 
 
and  
 
Anna Zalewska, University of Bath, UK 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 59 
 
October  2005 
 
 
 
Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe 
UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
Gower Street 
London 
 WC1E 6BT 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 8519 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7679 8777 
Email: csesce@ssees.ucl.ac.uk  
 1
 
De-industrialisation and the Post-Communist Transition. 
Rowthorn and Wells’ Model Revisited  
 
 
Tomasz Mickiewicz♣, University College London, UK, 
 
Anna Zalewska, University of Bath, UK 
 
 
16 September 2005 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we present a simple three-sector model explaining the structural change 
in employment, which is a modified version of Rowthorn-Wells (1987). We 
supplement the theoretical analysis with simple econometric tests, which illustrate 
how the modified Rowthorn-Wells model can be used to (i) motivate empirical 
estimates of the link between the level of development and structures of employment, 
(ii) illustrate structural distortions under the command economies, and the structural 
adjustment that happened during the post-Communist transition. We demonstrate that 
in the case of these economies, the transition process leads to an adjustment to the 
employment structures predicted by the model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
     Traditionally, structural change in employment appears in the economic literature 
as one of the factors associated with the economic development (e.g., Baumol (1967), 
Matsumaya (1992), Oulton (2001)). However, few studies offer thorough analysis of 
the origins and the nature of the change in the employment structure itself. Rowthorn 
and Wells (1987, later denoted as R-W) argue, based on extensive empirical testing, 
that structural change is caused both by different productivity growth rates among 
sectors and by different income elasticities of demand for sectors’ products. In order 
to focus on the impact of these two factors they abstract from prices, wages and, 
generally market adjustment mechanisms, and concentrate on characteristics of long-
run market equilibrium outcomes instead. R-W introduce a three-sector dichotomy 
into their analysis, i.e., they divide the economy into agriculture, manufacturing and 
services, which also differentiates their model from other economic growth studies 
that typically use a less realistic, two-sector specification. For instance, Baumol 
(1967) and Oulton (2001) distinguish between services and industry, Matsumaya 
(1992) divides the economy into agriculture and manufacturing, and Temple (2001) 
talks about agriculture and non-agriculture.  
      In this paper, we built on R-W’s specification but modify their model. In 
particular, even though R-W divide the economy into agriculture, industry and 
services, they do not fully exploit the benefits of such specification. This is because 
they assume that the change in productivity growth rate is the same in agriculture and 
industry. In other words, one of their main empirical findings, i.e., the driving force of 
different productivity growth rates across sectors, is not fully incorporated into the 
theoretical setting. In their model, the only distinction between the industry and 
agriculture sectors is done at the level of demand functions, i.e., income elasticities, 
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the other driving force of the structural change. However, here there is also some 
weakness. According to R-W’s stylised model, the economy produces a fixed amount 
of food per head, and services are a constant proportion of the total output. The 
industrial sector produces the remainder. In other words, they assume that people first 
satisfy their need for food and services, and then for industrial products. The 
preference for services before industrial products is counterintuitive and has 
significant analytical consequences. In particular, an implication of the specification 
of the model is that the proportion of industrial output to total output increases over 
time, contrary to the empirical evidence.  
       In this study, following R-W, we define three sectors (i.e., agriculture, industry 
and services) but deviate from R-W is several keyways. First, we allow all three 
sectors to have different productivity growth rates. Second, we assume that because 
consumers first satisfy their demand for food, then industrial products and, finally, 
services, industrial output is proportional to total output whereas R-W assume that 
service output is proportional to total output. Third, we assume that sector’s 
productivity is a function of accumulated human and physical capital per employee, 
not just a function of time. 
      We supplement the theoretical analysis with simple econometric tests, which 
illustrate how the modified Rowthorn-Wells model can be used to (i) motivate 
empirical estimates of the link between the level of development and structures of 
employment, (ii) illustrate structural distortions under the command economies, and 
the structural adjustment that happened during the post-Communist transition. We 
demonstrate that in the case of these economies, the transition process leads to an 
adjustment to the employment structures predicted by the model. 
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       The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the motivation 
for choosing a modified version of the Rowthorn and Wells’ model for our analysis. 
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses our empirical findings. Finally, 
Section 5 closes the paper with conclusions. 
 
2. Literature: the importance of three-sector models and the role of services 
      In contrast to R-W’s approach, there is a large literature that explicitly focuses on 
prices and wages in sectors to model employment flows between sectors. For 
instance, Baumol (1967) assumes that, although sectors’ productivities change at 
different pace, the wages in the two sectors (i.e., industry and services) are equal and 
grow with the productivity of the more progressive sector.1 This leads to an increase 
in production costs in the less progressive sector and drives the results. In contrast, 
Temple (2001) approaches the problem of adjustment from a slightly different angle 
by assuming that workers are paid the value of sectors’ marginal products (note: 
prices are fixed).  
      R-W’s analysis is distinguished from other studies on structural adjustment of 
employment in that that it is based on the comparison of equilibrium points. More 
precisely, they contrast economic states where the implicit price and wage adjustment 
have already taken place. It is also one of the first theoretical models that highlights 
the positive role of the growing service sector. In contrast, Baumol (1967) drew an 
apocalyptic picture of the world in which a higher productivity growth sector, i.e., 
industry, is squeezed by a lower productivity sector, i.e., services, resulting in the 
unavoidable slow down of output growth in the long run. For many years this was a 
received wisdom. For example, Bluestone (1983) and Cohen and Zysman (1987), 
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blamed the outflow of the labour force from well-paid manufacturing to the not so 
well-paid service sector for the slowdown of the American economy.   
       However, more recent studies have rehabilitated the role of the service sector. For 
example, Krugman (1994, 1996) and Crafts (1996) argue against blaming services for 
the economic slowdown. Furthermore, the close link between the growth of the 
service sector and economic development is a theme of many empirical studies. For 
instance, Riddle (1987) in a comparison of 81 countries (excluding the Eastern 
European and Middle-East oil-exporting countries) presents a convincing argument 
that allocation of addition labour to the service sector gives better economic outcomes 
than allocation to the agricultural or manufacturing sectors. She argues that ‘economic 
growth is closely linked to growth in the service sector’. Price and Blair (1989) in 
their study of the development of the UK service sector conclude that ‘services are an 
important element of prosperity’. Broadberry (1993, 1998, 2000), comparing the 
development paths of the UK, the US and Germany, underlines the role of growth of 
the service sector. In other words, the empirical evidence seems to support R-W’s 
argument, and their empirical findings, concerning the significance of the service 
sector. Finally, Oulton (2001) in his theoretical work shows that Baumol’s (1967) 
conclusion of economic slowdown can be reversed if one assumes that the service 
sector produces intermediate products, a common situation nowadays. 
 
An additional problem with the two-sector models is that they cannot 
simultaneously cover two different processes: (i) an early stage of development, 
where the key structural change relate to the outflow of the labour force from 
agriculture, and the build-up of both services and industry, (ii) the deindustrialisation 
                                                                                                                                            
1  Note that productivity growth changes are also exogenous to the system. 
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process in the advanced, high income economies. The R-W model captures the 
stylised characteristics of both. 
     
3. Modelling the link between structures and development  
     Drawing from R-W’s work we define a closed three-sector economy (agriculture, 
industry and services). We assume that there are no inter-sectoral externalities, and no 
restrictions on the free flow of labour among sectors. Because the impact of 
productivity growth, not the source of it, is our concern, we assume that changes in 
productivity growth rates are exogenous to the system. More formally, productivities 
in the three sectors are defined as 
k
a
aey λ= ,          ki iey λ= ,      ks ey = ,   
where subscripts a, i and s relate to agriculture, industry and services respectively. 
Parameters λa and λi (≥1) denote differences in productivity growth rates among 
sectors. Such specification is consistent with earlier studies; i.e. we assume that the 
productivities of the agricultural and the industrial sectors grow faster than the 
productivity of services.2 Parameter k (≥0) refers to total accumulated human and 
physical capital per employee and can be interpreted as the coefficient of inter-
sectoral productivity. The level of productivity at the beginning of the development 
path is normalised to one. This assumption does not have any impact on our results, 
but simplifies the notation.   
     Aggregate employment, L, is defined as proportional to total population N, that is 
L = fN,                                                                       (1) 
                                                 
2 The assumption of the lowest growth rate of the service sector is common (for example, Millward 
(1988), Rowthorn and Wells (1987), Oulton (2001) and, of course, Baumol (1967)). 
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where f ∈(0,1) denotes the employment rate interpreted as a percentage of the total 
population. By treating aggregate employment as an exogenous variable we abstract 
from labour market issues. Our intention is to demonstrate that a purely structural 
approach offers a suitable tool to explain changes in employment structures. 
       It is commonly accepted in the economic literature that the income elasticity for 
food is low at the margin. Therefore, following R-W, we assume that it is equal to 
zero. Thus we define output in agriculture as proportional to the size of the 
population. Then, agricultural output and employment are correspondingly given by: 
            Za = γ N,       (2a) 
La = Za / ya,     (2b) 
where,  γ (>0) is a coefficient of demand.  
    Demand for industrial goods defines the size of employment and output of the 
sector. We assume that the industrial output, Zi, (equivalent to real demand) is a 
constant fraction of total output, that is Zi = µZ, where µ ∈(0,1). Following that, more 
formally, employment and output of the industrial sector can be expressed 
correspondingly as: 
isi
sasaa
i yyy
yLLyyLL µµ
µ
−+
−+= )( ,                  (3a) 
Zi = Li yi.      (3b) 
Finally, employment and output in services are determined according to the equations: 
                Ls = L – La – Li,     (4a) 
                       Zs = Ls ys.     (4b) 
 8
     The above specification reflects the highly stylised fact that people first of all 
satisfy their demand for food, then for industrial products and finally services. It is 
also consistent with the assumption that income elasticities of demand differ across 
sectors. In our setting the income elasticity of demand for agricultural products (food) 
is zero, for industrial products is 1 and for services is [1+γN/((1-µ)Z-γN)] >1. 
        It follows directly from the model specification that aggregate output Z is: 
kk
kk
k
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.               (5) 
It is important to note that the three-sector specification makes sense when the 
conditions are such that all three sectors exist, that is, when there is positive demand 
for products from each of them. In other words, the economy must be ‘developed’ 
enough that people can afford to buy food, industrial products as well as pay for 
services. More formally, this requires 
.ZNZ µγ +>  
This is a very weak restriction to impose on model’s parameters. This is equivalent to 
assuming that 
f
ek γµ ⋅−> 1
1  .                                                  (6) 
Given that k must be positive, inequality (6) implies that the threshold level for the 
accumulated human and physical capital per employee, k, must be  
)).1ln()ln(,0max(* µγ −−= fk                                       (7) 
 
Sector productivities depend on the level of accumulated human and physical capital 
per employee in the following way: 
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It is obvious that the sign of equation (8a) is negative. However, equation (8b) can be 
either positive or negative. If the level of accumulated human and physical capital per 
employee is below some threshold level 
_
k  then the increase in k causes the increase 
of the employment share of the industrial sector, i.e., .0>∂
∂
k
li If k>
_
k , 
then .0<∂
∂
k
li  Whether 
_
k is greater than k* defined by (7) depends on values of the 
other parameters, and in particular, on the relationship between λa and λi.3 For 
example, low values of µ (i.e., µ < 0.5) and λi (i.e., λi <λa) guarantee that  k*<
_
k .  
Combining (8a) and (8b), it is also easy to show that (8c) is always positive. 
In other words, the country’s development, as represented by the increase in k, is 
characterised, first, by an increase in the industrial sector’s employment share, and 
then by a wave of de-industrialisation. The labour outflow from the agricultural sector 
is first absorbed by industry and services. Then, after attaining by the country some 
level of economic welfare, the service sector grows further supplied by contracting 
industry and agriculture. 
To complete the analysis we look at the impact of changes in k on the total output:  
                                                 
3 Details of the calculations can be obtained from the authors.  
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In this formula all terms are positive with the exception of the term containing (λa - 
λi) if λa <λi. However even in this case the derivative 
k
Z
∂
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because the expression in brackets multiplied by µ ek is always positive. Namely, 
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The results are consistent with our expectations, that is, the higher the level of 
accumulated human and physical capital per worker, the higher the level of total 
output. Since one single aggregate measure of capital endowment is difficult to 
construct, the level of output per capita can be used as its proxy in empirical work. 
 
4. Hypotheses and empirical tests 
 
Hypotheses, specifications, and measurement issues 
It is not difficult to test the basic predictions of the model.  
First, as we just established, we expect: 
- a reverse-U-shaped relation between the accumulated volume of (human and 
physical) capital and the industry share in employment, 
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- a monotonic and positive relation between the accumulated capital and the 
share of services in employment, 
- a monotonic and negative relation between the accumulated capital and the 
share of agriculture in employment. 
Second, the model implicitly assumes market equilibria (driven jointly by sectoral 
productivities and sectoral demands). However, the industrial composition of 
employment and production may not always result from market equilibria. In the non-
market case, the structural outcomes will differ from the model predictions. Our 
empirical counterpart of this situation relates to the command economies, in which, 
following the Marxist ideology, a deliberate attempt was made to maximise the share 
of industry in output. 
 
The first model ((9) and corresponding specification (i) in Table 1) is intended 
to offer a test for our general model of structural change. To test for the non-
monotonicity of the share of industry in employment as a function of economic 
development, we use the following model specification: 
tititititititi unemplfuelexmanexyyindemp ,5,4,3
2
,2,10, __])[ln()ln(_ εαααααααα ++++++++=  (9) 
Where: 
- emp_ind denotes the share of industry in employment  taken as dependent variable, 
- y denotes the GDP per capita that proxies for the accumulated human and physical capital. 
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In addition, we control for the features, which are not directly included in our model, 
but may have significant impact on employment structure. Namely: 
- ex_man refers to the share of manufacturing in exports,  
- ex_fuel denotes the share of fuel in exports, and  
- - unemploy is the rate of unemployment. 
We replicate the same model for the two other sectors (services and industry), 
expecting monotonic relationship, in contrast with industry (positive coefficients for 
services, negative for agriculture) (specifications (ii) and (iii) in Table 1 below). 
In model (9), using both logarithm and logarithm squared of the GDP per capita 
should allow us to test for the reversed U-shape, i.e. the non-monotonic functional 
relationship between the economic development and the industrial share in 
employment. Whether a country is on an increasing or decreasing slope depends on 
the size of the accumulated human and physical capital (see our discussion of 
equation 8b). Therefore, if the model prediction is correct, we should observe a 
positive sign of the a1 coefficient and the negative sign of the a2 coefficient.  
As any model is by necessity a simplified representation of reality, it is fairly standard 
to include some control variables that represent omissions in the model in empirical 
specifications. Firstly, the share of manufacturing in exports and the share of fuel in 
exports may both affect the share of industry in employment positively due to 
specialisation (and, by the same token, the shares of other sectors may be affected 
negatively). Secondly, unemployment rate accounts for cyclical variation in the share 
of employment of industry around some equilibrium path represented by our 
structural model. In particular, it is expected that low level of economic activity 
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results in both higher unemployment and the relative loss of employment in industry, 
as the latter sector may be more sensitive to cyclical variation in demand. 
Correspondingly, either both (subsistence) agriculture and low-paid services may 
accommodate some of employment shocks experienced by industry, or they may 
experience weaker cyclical shocks. Both effects will result in procyclical adjustment 
in the industrial share in employment. Thus, we expect the negative relationship 
between unemployment and the share of industry in employment. We do not have 
strong priors related to the two other sectors in this respect, as we are uncertain about 
the strength of relative effects in these two cases. 
Finally, the model includes the full set of individual country fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. 
 
Our second set of hypotheses relate to the difference between the market driven 
outcomes (to which our model applies) and distorted outcomes, which should be 
observed in command economies. Correspondingly, we test the following two 
models: 
tititititititi CEunemplfuelexmanexyyindemp ,5,4,3
2
,2,10, __])[ln()ln(_ εαααααααα +++++++++= (10) 
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In model (10) (equivalent to specification (ii) in Table 1 below)) we simply add a 
dummy variable representing a command economy as our test of structural distortion. 
We expect positive sign, representing the structural distortion (overindustrialisation) 
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resulting from the priorities imposed by the central planner.4 Next we investigate, if 
the magnitude of distortion under command economy was related to the level of 
development. For this purpose, we interact the dummy variable representing the 
command economy with the two terms representing income per capita (in both linear 
and quadratic component) (equation (11) and correspondingly equation (iii) in Table 1 
below). 
 
Our empirical definition of the command economy relates to the group of twenty 
seven countries in Central Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the Communist period 
(this group of countries is considered by the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (see: EBRD 1995-2004)), plus China, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea 
and Vietnam, where we assume that the command economy did not finish yet.  
The main empirical difficulty relates to the choice of the definition of the time 
point of exit from the command economy, for the group of twenty seven Euro-Asian 
countries, which are now referred to as ‘transition economies’. The timing of 
transition plays important role in our estimations, due to the fact that we include 
individual fixed country effects, which implies that we test is the impact of exit from 
the command economy on structures of employment. If the model is correctly 
specified, then liberalisation should be positively correlated with the process of 
returning to the structural (market equilibrium) outcomes (i.e., deindustrialisation 
should occur after the command economy is dismantled).  
                                                 
4 For a recent concise discussion of the command economy and its economic priorities, see for instance 
Gros and Steinherr (2004), Chapters 1-2. 
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We opt for the empirical simplification, where we define the exit from the command 
economy as equivalent to the time point where radical set of market reforms was 
introduced for the first time. This bias our empirical tests against our hypotheses, 
namely, the structural adjustment caused by reforms was not instantaneous, therefore, 
the difference between structural outcomes driven by market choices and these 
resulting from the administrative command is empirically weakened. 
Our motivation to follow the simple empirical distinction between the ‘old’ command 
economies and the liberalised market economies is motivated by the economics of 
transition literature. In methodology, if not in all details of measurement, our 
definition of transition from the command to the market economy (being equivalent to 
the introduction of the basic set of liberalisation measures) follows the research 
tradition established in the economics of transition field, both in theoretical approach 
(Blanchard 1997; Roland 2000) and in empirical work. Early example of dating of the 
transition process based on EBRD indicators can be found in De Melo and Gelb 
(1997). In addition, the transition date defined by the basic set of liberalisation 
measures (similar to what we apply) is commonly used in recent empirical work on 
economic growth in transition countries, which reorder the time dimension according 
to the ‘time of transition’ counted, again, from the time point when the basic set of 
liberalisation measures was introduced (De Melo et al. (2001); Falcetti et al. (2002); 
Merlevede (2003)). Following this, we similarly define the introduction of market 
economy as empirically equivalent to time point, when the average of the three main 
EBRD indicators of liberalisation ((i) price liberalisation, (ii) external liberalisation 
and (iii) freedom of entry & privatisation of small enterprises) take the value of 3 or 
higher. By this definition, the first country to exit from the command economy system 
was Poland in 1990, followed by Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Slovakia and 
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Slovenia in 1991. Hungary, which adopted a more gradualist approach to 
liberalisation, exited from the command economy in 1992. The same year applies to 
Mongolia5, and in 1993, it was Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and last but not 
least Russia. In 1994, it was the turn of Bulgaria, Romania and Kyrgyzstan, followed 
by Kazachstan and Moldova in 1995, and Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine in 1996. 
War-torn Bosnia and Azerbaijan joined the market economies club only in 1998, 
Tajikistan in 2000, and Serbia in 2001. Interestingly, by this definition, in three post-
Soviet countries – Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the command economy is 
not yet dismantled at time of writing.6  
All macro data is drawn from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 
(CD ROM). We use all available data points for the 1980-2002 time window frame. 
GDP per capita is measured in constant 1995 international dollars. 
 
Estimation results 
Results of our estimations are presented in Table 1 below. First three specifications 
(columns (i)-(iii)) are based on equations (9)-(11) respectively, with the share of 
industry in employment taken as dependent variable. The next four specifications 
(columns (iv)-(vi)) relate to share of services and share of agriculture 
correspondingly.  
                                                 
5 EBRD does not provide reform indicators for Mongolia. The chosen exit date follows from our own 
assessment of the reform process in Mongolia based on Boone et al.  (1997). 
6 It is also worth noting three earlier empirical contributions that consider structural outcomes in the 
context of the economic transition: Dohrn and Heilemann (1993; 1996); Lanesmann (2000). 
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The results can be interpreted as follows. 
First, our control variables have all expected signs and are mostly significant.  
Export specialisation in both manufacturing and extracting industries (fuel) result in 
higher share of industry in employment, as expected (equations (i)-(iii)). The parallel 
effect is that the share of manufacturing in exports has negative impact on the share of 
services and the share of agriculture in employment (albeit the second effect is 
insignificant). The impact of extracting industry exports (fuel) is highly insignificant 
and the corresponding variable is omitted in reported specifications for services and 
agriculture.7 
Spans of unemployment are associated with depressed employment in industry, which 
is consistent with our expectations, i.e. the share of industry in employment is pro-
cyclical.  Interestingly, the share of agricultural in employment is also pro-cyclical, 
albeit the corresponding effect is weaker, if still significant. On the other hand, the 
share of services in employment is countercyclical. The latter result may interpreted 
in two ways. One is consistent with stylised labour market characteristics, where 
aggregate shocks in services may be absorbed more by wages than by employment, 
due to higher flexibility of the former. Parallel effect may be that services absorb 
some of the employment released by the industry in a period of low economic activity 
(including self-employment). We do not investigate these effects closer in the paper, 
as they remain outside our main focus. 
                                                 
7 Those results and other including the full set of variables are available on request from the authors. 
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More importantly, the regression results are consistent with the theoretical model 
presented in section 3. We detect the reverse-U-shaped relationship of industry share 
in employment with the level of economic development, with a turning point being 
likely to be located somewhere around $8,000 per capita (1995 prices; specification 
(iii)). The results on the other two sectors are equally consistent with the model 
predictions. We detect a positive monotonic relationship between the share of services 
in employment and the level of GDP per capita and a negative monotonic relationship 
for the share of agriculture in employment. In both cases, when the quadratic terms 
were added to the corresponding specifications, those turned out being highly 
insignificant (not reported). 
Third, our conjecture on the interpretation of the model as a series of market 
equilibria is also consistent with the empirical evidence on the command economies. 
The latter group come across as characterised by high shares of industry in 
employment, above those implied for their market (or ‘mixed’) counterparts 
(specification (ii)). Economic transition results in return of these economies to the 
equilibria implied by market based organisation.  
To investigate the distortions caused by the command economy further, we interact 
the CE dummy with the GDP per capita. Interestingly, while the basic effect, 
represented by the shift parameter (CE), remains positive and significant, its 
magnitude is now much higher. The explanation for this is that the introduction of the 
interactive terms matches the characteristics of the command economy structural 
policies more closely. Namely, we have a negative interactive term with the linear 
component of GDP per capita and positive interactive term with the quadratic 
component of GDP per capita. All effects taken together imply that the structural 
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distortions were strongest in the group of command economies that should be 
expected to de-industrialise as a result of achieving a relatively high level of income 
per capita, but did not. While at the final period of Communism (late 1980s), most of 
the command economies were located below the structural turning point in terms of 
income per capita, some Central European economies - Slovenia, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics (or rather Czechoslovakia at time of the regime switch), Hungary, 
and Poland - where either already beyond the hypothetical turning point of 
deindustrialisation or close to it. That is, the structural distortions caused by the 
command economy had most serious effects for these countries. This may shed 
additional light on the characteristics of the systemic crisis in the final period of the 
command economy. 
Parallel to that effect, we can see a complex logic of structural distortion under the 
command economy for services (equation (v)). The shift effect (CE) and interactive 
effect with GDP per capita have opposite signs: the former positive and the latter 
negative. Taken together they imply that in the early phase of development the 
command economy system may actually result in the larger size of the service sector. 
However, the opposite is true for command economies characterised by the higher 
levels of GDP per capita. In these, service sector does not expand adequately. The 
latter effect mirrors what we found for industry, where the opposite is true. Again, the 
results reiterates our conclusion that the structural distortions were of most serious 
nature for command economies characterised by the highest level of income per 
capita (i.e. in the higher middle income group). 
The structural effects of the command economy are less complicated for agriculture. 
We found the interactive effect highly insignificant and the simple shift effect 
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significant. Thus, adoption of the command economy results in lower share of 
agriculture regardless of income level. 
Finally, we may notice that when the link between structural change and development 
is tested without taking proper account of the fact that the command economies 
remain off the equilibrium path of structural evolutions, the resulting estimates of 
structural turning points are biased downwards. It can be easily seen from the 
comparison of the estimated turning points in equation (iii) and (i). The former (which 
we take as more appropriate) indicates the turning point to be higher by about $1,000 
than the latter. 
 
5. Conclusions  
      In this paper we concentrate on explaining the structures of employment by the 
level of economic development and the type of economic system adopted (command 
versus market based). We demonstrate that a version of the Rowthorn-Wells model 
can be use to explain both the general link between structures and development, and 
the adjustment towards structural equilibria after the transition from the command to 
the market economy. One of the more interesting empirical effects we found is that 
the structural distortions in the command economies were most acute for these 
countries that were already on the higher level of development. Seen from this 
perspective, paradoxically, the Communist system had sown the seeds of its own 
defeat: economic development along the ideologically prescribed trail had led to the 
amplification of structural distortions, moving these economies further away from the 
efficient path. The corollary of this is that the command system may be sustainable 
only is a country, where the economy is relatively stagnant, as exemplified by North 
 21
Korea or possibly Cuba. For countries like Vietnam and China, at some stage, high 
growth (which is already fuelled by partial market reforms) may become 
unsustainable once the higher level of development and income per capita is reached, 
as the continuation of fast growth may become conditional on the switch to a fully 
fledged market system. 
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Table 1. Testing the implications of the model of structural change 
 
Dependent variable Share of industry in employment Share of services in employment Share of agriculture in employment 
 (i) 
 
(ii) 
 
(iii) 
 
(iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Ln of GDP p.c. 64.96*** 
(5.85) 
66.60***  
(5.86) 
81.52*** 
(6.54) 
19.60*** 
(1.76) 
21.27*** 
(1.83) 
-12.15*** 
(1.86) 
-12.30*** 
(1.85) 
Ln of GDP p.c. squared -3.65*** 
(0.33) 
-3.75*** 
(0.33) 
-4.52*** 
(0.36) 
    
Share of manufacturing in 
exports 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
Share of fuel in exports 0.04† 
(0.02) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
    
Unemployment rate -0.37*** 
(0.03) 
-0.37*** 
(0.03) 
-0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.67*** 
(0.08) 
0.70*** 
(0.08) 
-0.21* 
(0.08) 
-0.21* 
(0.08) 
Command Economy (CE) 
dummy 
 3.54** 
(1.25) 
1399.22*** 
(244.44) 
 92.82*** 
(28.96) 
 -10.05*** 
(3.06) 
CE x (Ln of GDP p.c.)   -355.14*** 
(62.87) 
 -11.38*** 
(3.54) 
  
CE x (Ln of GDP p.c. sq)   22.48*** 
(4.02) 
    
Constant -256.93*** 
(26.00) 
-264.30*** 
(26.04) 
-334.60*** 
(29.47) 
-124.88*** 
(15.70) 
-139.94*** 
(16.33) 
129.28*** 
(16.54) 
130.60*** 
(16.47) 
F statistics 28.33*** 27.79*** 28.06*** 26.76*** 25.36*** 6.79*** 7.01*** 
R squared 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.49 0.47 0.13 0.47 
N of observations 1142 1142 1142 1178 1178 1178 1178 
No of countries 95 95 95 96 96 96 96 
Turning point $7264 $7282 $8215 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Notes: 
(1) Fixed country effects and fixed time effects (annual dummies) included but not reported;  
(2) *** significant at 0.001; ** significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05; † significant at 0.1. 
(3) Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004. When using this dataset, one should note that some entries for employment shares are incorrectly 
given as zeros (all three sectors in a given year). We transformed these few cases into missing values, which the zeros stand for. 
(4) Command economy dummy: see discussion in the main text.  
(5) GDP per capita: in constant 1995 US dollars. 
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